This scheme indicated in the constitutional text is not comprehensive. The Court, while deciding the illustrative instance of the Tamil Nadu Governor dragging the Bills, had occasion to scan the intent and the content of the constitutional provisions. One major deficit of the provisions is a lack of a time limit for the Governor or the President to carry out their prescribed function. Again, provisions imply a great element of trust in the constitutional functionaries, which, however, stands betrayed over a period, especially in the recent past. A textual reading of the provisions can only perpetuate these deficits, which in turn, cannot resolve the issue placed by Tamil Nadu in the given case. This realisation has constrained the Court to fix the time limit for gubernatorial and presidential decisions on the Bills. This again has led to the judicial assertion that certain actions or inactions by the constitutional functionaries under these provisions cannot escape judicial scrutiny. In the given scenario, the idea of deemed assent by the President was a constitutional synthesis, for which Article 142 of the Constitution provides a formidable foundation. <\/p>\n

The judgment relied on the Sarkaria Commission Report (1988) which said that \u201cnonconformity of a state Bill to the policy of the Union Government is not always a safe ground for withholding presidential assent from it\u201d. The verdict has also underlined the requirement to have reasoned orders when constitutional functionaries choose to decline assent. It rejected the idea of \u201csimpliciter withholding\u201d of the Bills. Thus, the perceived immunity attached to the Governor and the President in the legislative process is completely removed by the judgment. It is a proclamation of people\u2019s democracy in the legislative process. <\/p>\n