‘There would be a correction of a weakness, which is the absence of political continuity in the journey from war to peace’
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The tension between the ideals of the United Nations (UN) and the structure created to uphold them has rarely been as evident as it is today as the organisation commemorates the 80th anniversary of its founding. Designed to prevent catastrophic war, the UN Security Council (UNSC) still reacts to conflict but no longer sustains peace. Across continents, conflicts endure for years without resolution not only because they are complex but also because the international system abandons political engagement too soon. Peace agreements falter. Transitions stall. Diplomacy, rather than being an ongoing process, has become a form of crisis theatre —activated too late and withdrawn too early.
This problem is not simply about political divisions. It is about institutional design. The UN has no dedicated body to maintain political accompaniment once violence slows and mediation efforts fade. The UNSC authorises action but is structurally episodic. Peacekeeping missions stabilise ground conditions but are seldom equipped with a political strategy. The Peacebuilding Commission, though a valuable initiative, lacks the mandate and the authority to engage during active political transitions. The UN loses continuity. It loses context. It loses momentum. It forgets.
Structural reform of the UNSC is necessary and long overdue. But waiting for such reform as a precondition for all institutional innovation is a strategic mistake. Functional reform — reform that strengthens the UN’s ability to act now, using powers that already exist under the Charter — is both possible and urgent. The UN General Assembly, under Article 22, has the authority to establish new subsidiary bodies to carry out its work. It has used this power before. It can use it again.
A clearly defined space
A ‘Board of Peace and Sustainable Security’ would fill the institutional void that now undermines conflict resolution. It would not challenge the primacy of the UNSC in matters of international peace and security. It would not intrude into the sovereign affairs of states. It would not undertake early-warning or pre-conflict intervention — areas that raise real political concerns for many countries. Instead, it would occupy a clearly defined space: providing structured political engagement during and after conflict, where today the UN presence dissipates.
Its tools would be political rather than coercive: reinforcing nationally-led dialogue, accompanying peace agreement implementation, coordinating regional diplomatic initiatives and ensuring that peacekeeping operations are tied to achievable political pathways rather than becoming indefinite holding missions. It would work in coordination with the UN Secretary-General and the UNSC, subsume the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and help align UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategies with political outcomes. It would not challenge UNSC authority, or duplicate or encroach on the Secretary-General’s prerogatives under Article 99.
Keep it representative
The credibility of such a body would depend, above all, on who sits at the table. It must be representative but not unwieldy. That means no elite club, but no open forum either. A rotating membership of about two dozen states, elected by the UN General Assembly for fixed terms, would ensure balance and renewal. Regional distribution would be formally guaranteed, with Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and West Asia each carrying weight.
Crucially, regional organisations would not be observers, but participants, reflecting the reality that peace is shaped as much in Addis Ababa, Jakarta and Brasília as in New York. Power would not be inherited through permanent seats, nor paralysed by vetoes. The board would be built not on privilege but participation. Agenda items would be introduced only by a UN member-state, a regional organisation or the UN Secretary-General. There would be no civil society voting role, although they may have consultative participation.
The concept of sustainable security is essential here. It recognises that lasting peace cannot be maintained by security arrangements alone. Stability endures when political agreements are gradually legitimised through governance, inclusion and responsible leadership. Sustainable security is not preventive intervention by another name; it respects sovereignty and emerges from negotiated settlements implemented over time rather than imposed solutions. It links security to political reality (sustainable security combines conflict management with long-term political stability by aligning peace efforts with governance, development and regional cooperation. It avoids the intervention risks associated with “preventive security” and reinforces nationally led approaches).
Style of functioning
The board would not be another forum for general statements. It would be a working institution. It would stay engaged where others withdraw. It would track commitments long after the spotlight moves on. It would prevent institutional memory from dissolving between mandate renewals. It would reduce the drift that has become common in long-running UN engagements. It would give political shape to international presence when peace is young and fragile.
Its mandate would be modest in appearance but consequential in practice. It would bring a disciplined form of political accompaniment into the heart of the UN system. It would build continuity without expansionism, coordination without confrontation. It would reassure states that sovereignty is protected and reassure societies that peace will not be abandoned at the first difficulty.
UN reform has been discussed for too long in absolute terms. Either one accepts the system as it is or insists on rewriting it entirely. This is a false choice. Institutions do not survive by remaining unchanged; they survive by evolving responsibly. The ‘Board of Peace and Sustainable Security’ would not solve all that ails the multilateral system. But it would correct one of its most damaging weaknesses: the absence of political continuity in the journey from war to peace.
Reform does not always require new doctrine. Sometimes, it requires remembering first principles. Peace must be sustained. Political commitments must be accompanied. Diplomacy must be disciplined. Institutions must be built not for moments but for processes. The UN once understood this. It can understand it again —if it chooses to innovate where it still can. The ‘BPSS’ will not redistribute geopolitical power but would improve the UN’s ability to manage conflict responsibly. This is where meaningful reform can begin.
Nirupama Rao is a former Foreign Secretary of India. The views expressed are personal
Published – November 01, 2025 12:16 am IST
