​Testing governance: On the Sawalkote Hydroelectric Project

Fresh impetus for the Sawalkote Hydroelectric Project, planned as a 1.8-GW scheme on the Chenab, coincides with India’s unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) after the Pahalgam attack, giving it a geopolitical symbolism that risks overshadowing questions relating to the environmental impact. The Union Ministries of Power and Home Affairs have repeatedly stressed its strategic value to press for exemptions from impact and carrying capacity studies. But other factors cannot be wished away with a wand. The Chenab already hosts the Dulhasti, Baglihar, and Salal projects, in a “bumper-to-bumper” hydropower corridor. Ignoring cumulative impact here means underestimating compounded sediment loads and slope instability. The gravity dam proposed at Sawalkote, despite being described as run-of-river, will form a reservoir of over 50,000 crore litres, rendering it functionally closer to a storage dam. Its estimated cost has risen by ₹9,000 crore due to inflation and prolonged administrative uncertainty. The NHPC Limited’s recent record in comparable Himalayan projects shows many schedule slippages and cost overruns. Finally, rehabilitation costs account for just 0.6% of total expenditure whereas nearly 1,500 families will have to be resettled and 847 hectares of forests will have to be diverted.

In strategic terms, the project’s timing signals India’s intent to operationalise its entitlement over western rivers following the IWT’s suspension. Keeping the treaty in abeyance also removed procedural constraints, allowing projects such as Sawalkote and the Wullar Barrage to go ahead. However, this approach risks diminishing India’s credibility as a riparian state that abides by treaties, particularly in fora where it advocates rule-based transboundary governance. Pakistan has already challenged the suspension’s legality vis-à-vis the 1960 framework. Should India proceed with multiple large projects without cooperative mechanisms, future negotiations may potentially invite third-party scrutiny — precisely what it has long resisted. In any case, strategic assertion should come with ecological restraint, and would require regional studies and protocols to manage sediments for all future projects, regardless of treaty status. India should also institutionalise data transparency through regional or multilateral platforms, converting hydrological monitoring from a security risk into a confidence-building measure, which would also align strategic autonomy with stewardship. Sawalkote’s legacy will ultimately depend on whether India realises that national security and ecological responsibility reinforce each other.