Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India (December 4 and 5) for the India-Russia Annual Summit had sparked a great deal of interest across the world, apart from India itself, though for different reasons. The West, which since the Ukraine conflict in 2022, has boycotted the Russian President, was keen to see how the visit would turn out, and whether it would undermine the embargo they had imposed on him for reasons that are well known. The Elephant and the Bear, however, managed to adroitly handle the situation, and in a manner that gave little reason for satisfaction to the West, even while maintaining a veneer of strategic autonomy.
A deep connection
Meetings between the heads of state of India and Russia have always been viewed as seminal events. They have often produced transformative results. Few in India can possibly forget how the India-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed between the two countries in 1971, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister of India and Leonid Brezhnev was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, transformed the strategic landscape of South Asia. It enabled India to defeat Pakistan and ensure the liberation of East Pakistan, which became the nascent state of Bangladesh. Less significant, but reminiscent of Russia’s willingness to extend its hand of friendship to India, was Mr. Putin’s gesture in 2009 during a summit meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of waiving penalties to enable India to secure its second aircraft carrier supplied by Russia. Other instances, not all of it known to the outside world, but significant in so far as the close friendship between the leaders of the two countries, also exist. This has been the glue sustaining a relationship born out of mutual accommodation and faith.
The closeness of the relationship has often irked the West, which, even as it tilted towards Pakistan most of the time and railed against India’s policy of non-alignment, viewed Russia’s backing for India as an anti-West manoeuvre.
After 1971, the India-Russia relationship took on a fresh dimension, and since the Gorbachev era in Russia, India-Russia ties have gone from strength to strength. The presidency of Mr. Putin for the past quarter of a century further cemented the friendship. Successive Indian Prime Ministers have sustained this relationship.
The Russia-Ukraine war, however, became a test case in so far as India-Russia relations were concerned; India maintained strict neutrality, but it refused to join the anti-Russia bandwagon. This has since been a point of contention between India and the West.
The recent visit of the Russian leader is his first to India after the West imposed embargo on visits and meetings. Mr. Putin’s Delhi visit was, hence, invested with far greater interest than might otherwise have been the case. An earlier summit between the Indian and Russian leaders had taken place in Tianjin (in China), where Mr. Putin and Mr. Modi had displayed a great deal of warmth towards each other. This had, however, been anathema to the West.
The Joint Statement
Relations between Russia and the West have, if anything, deteriorated further ever since. Some in the West were possibly anticipating a shift in the content of the India-Russia relationship given the current flux in global politics, U.S. President Trump’s heightened tariffs on India for continuing to purchase Russian oil in the wake of the conflict in Ukraine, and other aspects. However, this has been belied, as the optics of the latest visit indicate.
The West, especially the U.S. and countries of the European Union, are certain to be disappointed at the outcome. Apart from the public display of warmth by the Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President on the latter’s arrival in Delhi, the relationship between the two countries, often touted as a relationship carved in stone, remains unaffected.
The Joint Statement issued following the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit makes this clear. Support for a further strengthening of the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia (marking the 25th Anniversary of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership between India and Russia), for instance, remains unchanged. The statement reiterates the special nature of the longstanding time-tested relationship characterised by mutual trust and respect for each other’s core national interests. The Joint Statement further envisages exploring new avenues for cooperation, while strengthening cooperation in traditional areas.
The optics of the visit were, hence, excellent. The media coverage exceeded expectations. The body language demonstrated by the two principals left nothing to be desired. There were more than the usual references to connectivity, and cooperation on transport corridors, especially on the Northern Sea route through the Arctic, and the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor. Technology and industrial collaboration also found prominent mention.
Leaving out defence matters
Yet, defence matters, which had so far provided the main spark as far as the relationship was concerned, were conspicuously absent from the Joint Statement. This has been a core item during the Putin era — and unless there was a deliberate decision to maintain diplomatic silence on supposedly controversial aspects and subjects, it would appear that the essence of the India-Russia relationship was changing. The reasons for this have yet to be explained, and give room for deep thought, especially during a period of global flux. The defence relationship and cooperation had always been seen and accepted as the bedrock of India-Russia relations; in this instance, however, it has been pushed into the background as of now. This is not merely significant, but could mark a shift in India’s attitude and approach, which has so far been (at least in defence matters) largely pro-Russia in outlook.
India has, of late, diversified its defence purchases to include countries such as Israel and France. Nevertheless, Russia has over the years provided the main sinews for India’s defence. It has been India’s most consistent ally in conflicts with countries such as Pakistan, with the latter being consistently backed by the West. It is not merely the consistency of Russian support, but also the quality of many of the items that Russia has been willing to supply India that has added a great deal of heft to India’s defence capabilities. At present, as was amply proved during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, Russia’s S-400 air and missile defence system (which has acquired a near mythical status and is widely credited with India’s success during the conflict), the Brahmos missile that India has jointly developed with Russia, and is a critical part of India’s arsenal, apart from items such as the Sukhoi SU-30 MKI, the T-90 Tanks, and transport helicopters, form an integral part of India’s defence structure. Considerable advances have also been made with regard to joint manufacturing and future collaboration between India and Russia in the arcane area of defence.
While India, no doubt, has certain new options to enlarge its military stockpile, Russia has historically been its largest most reliable and significant supplier of state-of-the-art weaponry on land, sea, and air. Of late, Russia has offered more of the same. A shift towards Western sources, given the current state of global politics, could therefore prove detrimental to India’s interests. While this might bring about greater European and U.S. endorsement of India’s policies, the actual costs need to be weighed carefully. It should be evident that little scope for a change exists, given that the West has never been a reliable partner while Russia has been.
To provide verisimilitude to what has been mentioned here about the less-than-friendly ties between India and the U.S., the U.S. Administration has recently notified Congress of a $686 million sustaining and modernisation package for Pakistan’s F-16 fighter jet fleet. The package would include avionic upgrades and cryptographic modules, mission planning software, simulators and logistical support from contractors. The latest notification comes on top of the $400 million upgrade programme, announced earlier in 2025. This is notwithstanding a recent Washington Declaration that has averred that U.S.-India ties are the defining relationship of the 21st century.
M.K. Narayanan, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, former National Security Adviser, and former Governor of West Bengal
