The looming threat to federalism and democratic tenets

The ruling government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party/National Democratic Alliance, has been pursuing the One Nation, One Election framework (ONOE) with all seriousness. This proposal seeks to synchronise the Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections under one single electoral cycle. While the advocates of the ONOE have cited several administrative and fiscal efficiencies, its opponents point to the far-reaching consequences of this plan on the democratic and federalist character of India, as laid out in the Constitution of India.

The historical context

Simultaneous elections are not something very new in India. During the initial years after Independence, the Election Commission of India (ECI) used to conduct simultaneous elections for both Parliament and State Assemblies. But this cycle of cooperative federalism was disrupted at the very outset with the appearance and imposition of Article 356, which is popularly known as President’s Rule. When this was done for the first time in Kerala in 1959, an element of federal overreach began to take hold of the Union-State relations, as the will of the Union appeared to override State autonomy. The arrangement was essentially meant to be a constitutional mechanism and provided for restoring normalcy in States where governance had become well-nigh impossible.

Article 356 was optimistically termed a “dead letter” by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, to be used sparingly. Yet, as H.V. Kamath aptly remarked, “Dr. Ambedkar is dead, and the Articles are very much alive”, reflecting the misuse that is implicit in this provision as a tool of political expediency. From 1950 to 1994, successive governments, notwithstanding their political hue, indulged in the misuse of Article 356 to the extent of dismissing ‘politically obnoxious’ elected State governments. Even after the S.R. Bommai case judgment, which aims to restore the federal government’s rights and limit the arbitrary acts of Governors, incidents continue. Its frequent invocation — over 130 times since Independence — has distorted that purpose.

Defection has also emerged as a strong threat to the stability of State governments. Democratically-elected governments have fallen after legislators have changed sides over various enticements. It was to prevent this form of democratic erosion that the Anti-Defection Law was enacted through the 52nd Amendment Act of 1985 as part of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, which attracts the disqualification penalty against defectors. But there are still loopholes. The absence of any sort of time-bound framework for Speakers to decide on disqualification petitions and provisions for “group defections” has rendered the law ineffective. The result is that defections are still commonplace, leading to unconstitutional changes in regimes.

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This is where the proposition put forward by the ONOE to align State election cycles with that of the Lok Sabha gets deeply problematic. In fact, the proposal goes all the way to make amendments in the Constitution, particularly in Articles 83 and 172, which guarantee a five-year term for Parliament and State Assemblies. Some blatant omissions in the governance regime include the misuse of Article 356 and the inadequacy of anti-defection laws. The State governments would face a much tighter squeeze in the ONOE, as their terms would be curtailed or extended to bring them in line with the national election cycle. This reduction in State autonomy is more than an administrative nuisance. It constitutes a deep attack on the federalist structure of the Constitution.

Federal structure under siege

The federal system of India, being a basic feature of Indian democracy, enables States to function as relatively independent units in solving problems of a localised nature. State elections that would have to be held along with the national elections would blur and impair the ability of electors to evaluate the performance of the State government. If the ONOE is held and if there happens to be a midterm ONOE, then State governments which were elected only for ‘abbreviated’ tenures would breach the democratic principle of “one person, one vote, one value”. In case a State government falls midterm, say after three years, the ONOE would lead to elections for a new government that would serve only the remaining time in the synchronised electoral cycle, roughly two years.

This cuts down the tenure of a government, making the mandate of the voter of little value; a new government would not complete its full term, reducing the democratic principle of complete representation. Truncated terms are not only an issue when it comes to State governments but are also of concern to the Lok Sabha too. For instance, from the political turbulence of the mid-1990s, there were elections in 1996, 1998, and 1999.

In fact, if the ONOE had been in place, there would have been another election in 2001, which would add up to four elections in five years. The frequency of elections results in increased costs — financial, administrative, and in terms of human capital — which are not realised in the efficiency that the ONOE is touted to bring. On nominal and practical grounds, each government needs a realistic time period to analyse the existing socio-political-economic state of affairs, frame adaptive policies and do course corrections. This artificially imposed reduction in the tenure of a government could disrupt governance, resulting in negative consequences that outweigh the usual policy paralysis caused by the enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct during elections.

The challenges in terms of logistics in implementing the ONOE are monumental. India’s large electorate base, of over 900 million voters, demands enormous resources to conduct elections. If the Lok Sabha, State and local body elections are aligned, the burden would increase manifold and eventually affect the ECI, security forces, and administrative machinery. The risk of voter fatigue and confusion cannot be ruled out.

Address the issues first

There needs to be reflection before the ONOE can be espoused for fiscal and administrative efficiencies. There is a need to revisit some of the systemic challenges that plague State governments. There needs to be course correction to ensure that the ONOE does not become a device for the centralisation of powers without addressing issues such as the misuse of Article 356, a strengthening of anti-defection laws, and the issue of the stability of State governments. The federal character of the Constitution is not an arrangement in procedure but a recognition of the diversity and the plurality that constitute the country. Forcing States to fall in line with a unified electoral cycle unduly erodes the autonomy of States and dilutes the democratic essence of governance.

A hurried imposition of the ONOE, without sets of systemic reforms that are necessary to stem the erosion of federalism, would indeed be a frontal attack on the Constitution’s basic structure. If this does not happen, then the ONOE can even be a blot instead of being deliverance for Indian democracy.

The fact that a malfunctioning fax machine sat at the heart of a cynical operation aimed at dispensing with the elected government of Jammu and Kashmir, illuminates the frailty as well as opacity regarding certain institutional processes in India, all too sharply. A few such instances make it clear that systemic reform is the immediate need so that people become accountable to the principles of the Constitution.

As long as these foundational areas remain unsorted, the ONOE, rather than solving those structural vulnerabilities, may end up making them starker. True democratic governance requires much more than a routine exercise of simultaneous elections. It is an imperative commitment to the letter and spirit of federalism and to strengthening State governments as equal partners in the federal polity of India.

Abhijay A. is a political analyst, poet, and an independent researcher. Thirunavukarasu S. is a junior research fellow, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras