Immediately after the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and former J&K PM Sheikh Abdullah decided to initiate dialogue with the purpose to bring back the latter to the mainstream politics after nearly two-decade estrangement after his 1953 infamous arrest. The interlocutors from PM Gandhi’s side were insistent that Sheikh Abdullah’s pre-condition that he should be given the pre-1953 status should not be met while Sheikh’s aides were in no mood to compromise.
With the dialogue having reached an impasse, public intellectual and one of close friends of Sheikh Abdullah, Balraj Puri, met with PM Gandhi and suggested that Sheikh’s demand to demand pre-1953 status should be conceded. At the same time, he added that it is not necessary to accept his demand or even outrightly reject the same. The rationale was that any agreement should ensure Sheikh’s political survival which was directly related to the fact that an agreement between the two should have public approval, particularly in Kashmir valley. PM Gandhi agreed to this wise suggestion as it was a win-win and this provided the overall framework to the February 1975 Beg-Parthasarthy accord that brought Sheikh Abdullah back to mainstream politics. The agreement enabled Sheikh Abdullah to retain his popularity in Kashmir valley till his death in 1982. There was hardly any major protest against the agreement and testimony to this effect was his funeral procession on 9 September, which eyewitness attest as one of the largest ever in South Asia.
In 1975, Sheikh Abdullah assumed power as Chief Minister, which was effectively a kind of downgrade from the position of Prime Minister that he enjoyed till his arrest on 9 August 1953. PM Gandhi had instructed her party which had 61 out of 75 seats in assembly to support Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference, which had none. Sheikh Abdullah accepted the whittled down version of Article 370. In 2024, his grandson faces a challenge of holding on to political support even though his party just won a comfortable majority in the Assembly. Mr. Omar Abdullah took oath as Chief Minister in a context of where Article 370 seems to be history and J&K had been downgraded to the status of a union territory from a state with its constitution and flag. But this is where the similarities between Sheikh Abdullah and his grandson end as a complex set of challenges, some of them are structural and age-old in nature, both within J&K and outside are going to constantly test the latter’s political acumen and maturity. With hardly any political honeymoon period available to the new Chief Minister these trends and challenges are already unfolding and require unpacking as they will have outsized impact on J&K as well as Indian polity in general.
While Sheikh retained his political popularity till his death the challenge before his grandson is whether he is able to do the same even though he is comfortably placed electorally for the next five-years. In this connection, all the indications from the center are that the restoration of statehood to J&K is imminent in the upcoming winter session of the Parliament. The present arrangement is a political liability for the BJP in a context where militancy related incidents are commonplace in J&K. Right now the onus of militancy related incidents in union territory of J&K is the responsibility of the central government. Giving statehood to J&K frees the BJP-led government from this liability and for a party for whom electoral considerations overweigh many other considerations it is likely that the statehood will be conceded soon. The early restoration of statehood will place the Unified Command, a civil-security joint apparatus on counter-terrorism in J&K established since the 1990s, under the direct control of the elected Chief Minister (CM), which is presently under the LG.
This brings to the question of what lies next after the restoration of statehood as that is where the political contestation will revolve around. Unlike his grandfather, who till his death remained arguably most popular Kashmiri in the post-1947 era, even though he came to power in 1975 without an election, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and his team cannot take their political base for granted. Kashmir valley’s political space has become competitive and the electorate is quick to discern any complacency or foul-play. The verdict in Kashmir valley and Muslim areas of Jammu, which far-exceeded the National Conference’s expectations, is to prevent the BJP from coming anywhere close to the power structure. The electorate didn’t want the division of votes as there was a realization that Hindu areas of J&K will vote for the BJP. The antipathy against the BJP in J&K is also grounded on the fact that they abrogated the Article 370. Speaking in the J&K Assembly, Mr. Omar Abdullah said that it is clear that the majority of the people of J&K haven’t accepted the abrogation of Article 370. He has also said in the past that it will be foolish to expect the BJP to reverse the decision taken on 5 August 2019.
But it is clear from the acrimonious maiden Assembly proceedings that the National Conference is conscious of the political resonance of the demand for restoration of Article 370 among the electorate. On the first day of the assembly, MLA, Waheed Parray, from the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), a party which just has three MLAs, brought a resolution against the 5 August 2019 move of the Centre to abrogate J&K’s special constitutional status.
Addressing the session, Mr. Omar Abdullah said the PDP’s resolution has “no importance and it is only for the cameras”. Anyhow a day later, Deputy Chief Minister and NC leader, Surinder Choudhary had moved a subtly drafted resolution which said, “That this legislative assembly reaffirms the importance of the special status and constitutional guarantees, which safeguarded the identity, culture and rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and expresses concern over their unilateral removal.” The draft didn’t directly mention Article 370 and as an attempt to soothe nationalist sentiment, in a preemptive move to deny BJP ground to attack across the country, stated: “This Assembly emphasizes that any process for restoration (of special status) must safeguard both national unity and the legitimate aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.” The NC leadership is also conscious of the fact that a section within the party don’t want to dilute the importance of the issue. Within the NC, the recent statements of Srinagar Lok Sabha MP, Ruhullah Mehdi, who is particularly popular with the millennials and Generation Z, indicate that he will remain an assertive voice on the restoration of special status in the Parliament.
Beyond the immediate round of political acrimony, the heavy-lifting on this issue for the CM and his team will be both within J&K and outside J&K. In this respect, the experience of the last seven-decade should inform the discussions and narrative around special status. A refined and subtle act of political outreach is required to avoid creating a situation where political aspirations for a special status for J&K are seen and heard in opposition to that of the rest of the country. Within J&K assembly, the BJP, with its highest ever recorded tally in assembly elections, has strongly opposed the resolution in the assembly. The narrative around Article 370 has become confined to symmetrical federalism and may have fallen victim to majoritarian impulses on either side, apart from other vectors. As a result, both supporters and detractors lost an opportunity to advance genuine discussions around the aspirations and challenges of India’s diverse units within a more logical and constructive ambit of asymmetrical federalism. In fact, some of the institutions such as the Supreme Court, Election Commission of India and Comptroller and Accountant General, which were extended to J&K at various intervals, as part of the dilution of Article 370 are part of the federal checks and balances. In fact, some say that if Supreme Court had jurisdiction over J&K in 1953 the NC founder, Sheikh Abdullah couldn’t have been arrested or dismissed as the charges were flimsy as indicated by the fact that they could never be proved in the court.
Also, the J&K Constitution gave unlimited powers to the Governor during Governor’s rule, a provision repeatedly used to dilute its special status. In all Indian states, a government’s failure would result in President’s Rule, whereas in the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, Governor’s Rule would initially be imposed for six months. In this period, Section 92 of the J&K Constitution would provide legislative powers to the Governor. In 1986, this provision enabled the Governor to extend Article 249 of the Indian Constitution to the [erstwhile] state to empower Parliament to legislate even on a matter in the State List, on the strength of a Rajya Sabha resolution.
The proponents of Article 370 within J&K underestimated the political resonance of its abrogation across the country. This is also because of the rigid interpretation of its interlinked provisions, such as Article 35A of the Indian Constitution. This article empowered the J&K state legislature to define “permanent residents” of the state and provide them with special rights and privileges. This prevented some long-term residents in J&K from acquiring domicile rights, including Partition refugees, many of whom were Dalits and poor. These facts proved to be at the heart of arguments presented by the defenders of the abrogation. It is also true that most political parties in India, except the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagham and the Left parties, did not come out in the open against the abrogation of Article 370. Prime Minister Narendra Modi referred to the plight of the “Valmiki community” in his speech to the nation on 9 August 2019. It was not a coincidence that the Bahujan Samaj Party’s president, Mayawati, was among the first opposition leaders to back the Centre’s decision. She tweeted on 6 August, 2019: “The demand to implement the Constitution’s ‘social, economic and political justice’ in the country by removing Article 370 and 35A was long pending. The BSP hopes the people there will get the benefits of the Central government’s decision.” That is why a smart strategy is required from the new CM and his team. They should be deeply conscious of granular realities of the country and reactions that a demand for restoration of special status can trigger in the rest of the country. Apart from working at many ends, the demand of special status has to be couched within the rubric of federalism and above all, political heavy-lifting is required by his knowledgeable interlocutors across the country to corral support in its favor.
Meanwhile, in the realm of governance, a good start was made in reversing some of the decisions of the last six-years. For instance, the decision to restore the academic calendar in the winter zones of the Union Territory by switching from the March session to the traditional November session. Education calendar is normally in line with the climatic conditions and J&K was no exception to the same with areas experiencing severe winters followed a winter zone and vice-versa. However, there are other contentious issues of governance and policy-making with wider societal implications. This relates to the wider understanding of J&K which is a diverse unit comprising ethnic, geographical, religious and linguistic diversities and ability to ensure societal equilibrium is upheld. One of the major issues that confronts the new government is the issue of reduction of jobs for the open merit category in government sector. In a region, where there is little physical infrastructure that could create sustainable, long-term economic security in the non-State sector and many yearn for State employment, some of the decisions taken in the absence of legislative assembly in the last six-years have been taken without factoring in complex social mosaic of J&K. For instance, the decision to give Schedule Tribe status to Pahari community has produced a backlash. The decision has further shrunk the open merit category as it has reportedly reduced only to thirty percent whereas the open category is seventy-percent of the population. Though political reservation to the Pahari community didn’t impact the 2024 electoral result, as the BJP had hoped, it is having far-reaching multi-layered societal friction. Earlier only Gujjars, who enjoy the ST status, opposed the granting of ST status to the Paharis as they feared that this will eat into their pie. Anxious over this development, the Gujjar community had taken to the streets. It has disputed the claim of Paharis being ‘tribal’, alleging that the ‘Paharis’ have no other glue except for a language and comprise people from diverse caste groups, including upper caste Muslims and Hindus. On the other hand, Pahari leaders have pointed out that only Bakerwals, who are nomadic tribes, actually fulfil the label of tribals. They argue that Gujjars, many of whom are settled, share their socio-economic conditions.
The problem with respect to affirmative action in J&K is that decisions had been taken hastily without applying objective criteria. For instance, in the context of spreading militancy, with a nod from the former prime minister, Chandra Shekhar, the Gujjar-Bakerwals were granted the ST status on April 19, 1991. The demand for the ST status by Paharis, who inhabit the areas near the LoC in Jammu as well as Kashmir valley, had been pending since the early 1980s. Knowing fully well that this will ignite societal friction, as giving ST status to a linguistic community will raise similar groups across J&K, the NC government under Dr. Farooq Abdullah left the final decision on the issue to the center. In 1989, the J&K government led by Farooq Abdullah recommended that Paharis should be included in the list of STs along with the Gujjars, who got the ST status in 1991 under Governor rule. This left the Pahari community feel ignored. Pahari language in J&K’s context, as it is recognized today, was construed to be one of the dialects of Punjabi. It got separate recognition in the 1911 census. Pahari-speakers were second in terms of numbers after Kashmiri-speakers in undivided J&K. Pahari is the language spoken by people along the areas near the LoC in both Kashmir and Jammu. Hindu and Sikh migrants, many of whom are now deceased, also speak this language across the LoC. J&K, like Bengal and Punjab, underwent a radical change after 1947. Pahari identity is one such socio-political construction that has taken shape on this side of the LoC under the altered, post-1947 realities.
As mentioned above, affirmative policy necessitates a granular understanding of the issues rather than decisions undertaken on the basis of partisan political considerations. The issue has to be seen objectively as marginalization is a consequence of spatial and temporal issues. In the Kashmir Valley, the Kashmiri-speaking society is homogenous in terms of language and ethnicity irrespective of religion. Gujjars, with their own distinct culture, stand out in the Valley. Their economic integration is relatively less. The Wagay caste among Kashmiri-speaking Muslims deals with the dairy trade, the traditional preoccupation of Gujjars. The realities change to the south of Pir Panjal — Jammu division — which is heterogenous both in terms of religion and ethnicity. Apart from Gojri, Gujjars are conversant in other languages such as Pahari, Dogri and Punjabi. For centuries, like the Hindu Gujjars in parts of North India, Muslim Gujjars have been involved in dairy farming in J&K. In neighbouring undivided Punjab, Gujjar Muslims reportedly had a population of nearly 4.6 lakh in the 1901 census. The lens of marginalization in this particular context is similar to that of Hindu Gujjars in other parts of North India. In the same vein, there are several historically marginalized communities within the Pahari-speaking people, such as Lohars, Telis and so on. Thus complex realities and its wider implications were ignored as the Pahari community was given the ST status. In the last six-years, there was a tendency to weaponize the diversity for electoral gains though the decision failed to yield BJP any tangible benefit. Anyhow, this has created a serious multi-faceted problem on the ground as now the main opposition to the present reservation policy is coming from Kashmir valley.
This brings to the larger goal of bridge-making across communities and regions in a context of Jammu and Kashmir’s ethnic or regional contestations which are a vital component of the “Kashmir tangle”. Yet this subject has remained under-researched, even though it requires rigorous inter-disciplinary knowledge. To understand this subject better one requires a grip over the components of J&K and its creation. Created in the 19th century by a merger of diverse cultural and geographical units, Jammu and Kashmir was one of the largest princely states and the most diverse in terms of geography, ethnicity and religion. Take Padder in Kishtwar, which became a new Assembly segment adjoins the Zanskar area of Ladakh and is represented by the leader of BJP legislative party Chief Sunil Sharma. A new seat may have provided better representation to such an inaccessible area, but it will be far from adequate an institutionalised response to address the specific problems of any such region.
Coupled with these realities, with some exceptions, the electoral verdict has de-facto divided the Muslim majority assembly segments of J&K, as they were won by the NC, from Hindu majority segments, which were won by the BJP. It should also be remembered that while a given assembly segment may have a religious majority there are areas within the same segment that may have a majority of the other religious group. In such a scenario, where the margin of error is slim as otherwise it may disturb delicate social equilibrium and can lead to nation-wide ramifications, the political executive will have to think beyond the short-term challenge and erect institutionalized bridges at various tiers of governance. In this context, the idea of federalism has to be fully internalized and not selectively articulated. While the NC justifiably makes a renewed bid for devolution of powers from New Delhi, as it had done in the year 2000 when resolution for Greater autonomy was passed by the J&K assembly and later on, rejected by the Atal Behari Vajpayee led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, it is equally important the same principle is applied within J&K. At present, a diverse J&K enjoys overly-centralized polity and only through properly decentralized and empowered institutions at the regions, districts, blocks and Panchayats level the principle of federalism can be entirely applicable to J&K and thus lessening the burden on political executive.
Finally, there is the perennial challenge of the last thirty-five-years of national security challenge emanating from J&K which will test the resolve of the executive at various fronts. Ever since the new Chief Minister took office there had been several incidents of militancy in Kashmir valley which was preceded by a series of attacks, particularly ambushes, on security forces in the hills of Jammu. This clearly underscore the challenges that lie ahead. The fencing along the international border and Line of Control is far from a foolproof mechanism to control infiltration of militants. The challenge of militancy has a strong transnational connection which require proactive synergy at various levels between the J&K government with center and its agencies. There will be host of issues where both sides may have to sensitize each other and work in cooperation.
For instance, the pros and cons of revival of Line of Control trade, which was part of the NC manifesto in the 2024 elections, have to be neatly assessed. As part of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan LoC trade was started in 2006 to facilitate exchange of goods of common use between local populations across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. The trade was allowed through two Trade Facilitation Centres located at Salamabad, Uri, District Baramulla and Chakkan-da-Bagh, District Poonch. The trade took place four days a week. The Trade was based on Barter system and zero duty basis. In a statement, the central government, while announcing the decision to stop LoC trade in April 2019, said, “it has been revealed that the trade has changed its character to mostly third party trade and products from other regions, including foreign countries, are finding their way through this route. Unscrupulous and anti-national elements are using the route as a conduit for Hawala money, drugs and weapons, under the garb of this trade.” It further said, “Investigations have further revealed that some individuals, who have crossed over to Pakistan, and joined militant organizations have opened trading firms in Pakistan. These trading firms are under the control of militant organizations and are engaged in LoC trade.”
While the component that is emanating from across the border can be better assessed and combatted by security forces and other central government agencies, one of the critical drivers of violent extremism locally that can led to local recruitment or support is social disaffection. Broadly, in a context of militancy, the political executive in J&K should be proactive in creating and fortifying a civilian deterrence to militancy. By curtailing J&K political executive’s powers, via weaning away police from its jurisdiction, makes the J&K political executive a bystander on the foremost challenge facing the people of J&K. There is no assurance that the thirty-five-year-old chapter of militancy in J&K will end with the restoration of statehood. At the same time, the trends on the ground are best understood and picked-up by the local agencies under political supervision as they are more aware of granular nuances and past patterns.
A short assembly session after the 2024 J&K Assembly elections has provided a purview of the challenges that face the newly elected political executive in J&K, particularly in the face of the fact that even with a clear electoral majority political popularity is fluid and can quickly fritter in a challenging political landscape. There are no easy, quick-fix solutions given the challenges confronting the new executive. While some of the challenges can be addressed by learning from the past patterns there will be age-old and new challenges that will require out-of-box thinking and approach from CM Omar Abdullah and his team by being grounded to the political realities of J&K as well as the rest of the country.
(Luv Puri has authored two books on J&K, including Uncovered face of militancy and Across the Line of Control)
Published – November 11, 2024 07:01 am IST
