India’s place in Russia-Ukraine peace-making

Two years after the Government of India held that “Europe’s problems are not the world’s problems” to distance New Delhi from the theatre of the Russia-Ukraine war, speculation about its determination to help resolve the war has gained traction. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visits to Moscow and Kyiv, a possible meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the United Nations next week and with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the BRICS Summit next month, as well as the travels of National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar all point in this direction.

The fact that Mr. Modi “briefed” United States President Joseph Biden in a phone call after the Ukraine visit, and Mr. Doval told Mr. Putin that he had been tasked to “brief” him about the visit as well when he met him in St. Petersburg last week indicate that India is engaging with all parties and developing its role as an interlocutor.

Editorial | Unrealistic expectations: On India and Russia-Ukraine peace

The question then is how far does Mr. Modi’s plan to play peacemaker stretch? And where can India’s role be most effective?

India’s role, the full picture

India’s advantages and reasons for playing such a role are many — it is one of the few countries that is engaging both sides of the geopolitical schism over Ukraine, i.e., the West as well as the Eurasian leadership. India’s long-held beliefs on non-alignment and strategic autonomy, which the Modi government has largely carried forward during the war with its abstention votes at the UN and refusal to accept western sanctions, help its image as an “honest broker” or mediator.

India is an important voice for the Global South and it succeeded in ensuring its G-20 presidency focused on war outcomes such as energy and food security that matter to the developing world rather than the war itself. As a result, the increase in India’s intake of Russian oil, leading to a six-fold increase in bilateral trade, has been projected as an assertion of its principles rather than profiteering.

In his third term, Mr. Modi would no doubt like to build a global legacy, much like India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was able to do by mediating between the USSR and Austria for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in exchange for a policy of neutrality, or by India leading international efforts and UN commissions on wars in Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia.

If it does essay such a role, the government would need a thorough assessment of the situation, beginning with a study of the state of war in Ukraine. Russian troops remain entrenched in about a sixth of territory of the country for more than two years now, while Ukrainian forces are successfully holding the line outside of these areas. This indicates that any change in the status quo could come only from a massive escalation in the war. Mr. Zelenskyy’s move to occupy Russian territory in Kursk was a novel tactic, but was perhaps only meant to be used as a bargaining chip or “leverage” as the Ukrainian President put it, in future negotiations. As he heads to New York next week, Mr. Zelenskyy will be seeking a further escalation: western permissions for the long-range Storm Shadow missiles, and Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACM) for airstrikes deep inside Russia, which he believes is receiving lethal weaponry from Iran and North Korea. Mr. Putin has said in no uncertain terms that if the West clears the request, it would be a declaration of direct war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia. An alternative outcome could also arise from the U.S. elections on November 5 — a win for former U.S. President Donald Trump may mean the U.S. curtails its expenditure in support of Ukraine, seen positively by Mr. Putin, and more sobering for Ukraine and Europe, while a win for U.S. Vice-President Kamala Harris will indicate continuity in the U.S.’s support.

An offering that would have to stand out

Second, New Delhi would need to offer its own proposal for conflict resolution or de-escalation taking into account that there are already a number of proposals in the arena, all of which have been rejected by one side or the other. Mr. Putin and Mr. Zelenskyy have rejected each other’s proposals, that involve giving up territory on the ground. Mr. Putin rejected the Bürgenstock Communiqué, that India also disassociated from, which dwelt on the issues of nuclear safety, humanitarian access and the exchange of prisoners.

Mr. Zelenskyy recently rejected the six-point Brazil-China joint proposal that proposed the same measures towards a path of “de-escalation”. China has, in the past year successfully brokered agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Hamas and Fatah. Hungary too, a country with access to both sides, made a ceasefire proposal which has been rejected by Ukraine.

Summing up India’s position in Berlin last week, Mr. Jaishankar listed a four-point principle: This is not the era of war; there are no solutions on the battlefield; Russia must be at the table for talks; and India is concerned and engaged to find a resolution to the conflict. While these principles are incontrovertible, they are by no means a concrete proposal, and India will need to work on a more comprehensive vision of its path to peace.

The next step would be to study what India’s role would be. During their conversation, Mr. Zelenskyy told Mr. Modi that India is simply too large and important a country to seek a role as “messenger” between Moscow and Kyiv. In any case, recent rounds of prisoner exchanges between the two countries make it amply clear that there are enough channels to relay information between them.

A larger role would imply India serving as a mediator or even the host for a summit between the two sides, although given India’s recusal from the Swiss Peace Summit outcome, may be a task left to one of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that have been a part of the process thus far. Whatever the decision, this is an exercise that will require India to use its heft, diplomatic goodwill and other resources apart from intensified travel by officials, Ministers and the Prime Minister focused on discussing solutions to the Russia-Ukraine war.

Consistency would be the key word

At a time when the government is dealing with internal conflicts including Manipur, revving up the economy through international engagement, regional turbulence and a host of other important issues, it could justifiably question the need to spend its resources on this conflict. Externally, when civilian casualties from Israel’s bombardment of Gaza or from the civil war in Sudan are far more than those estimated to be non-military casualties in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the question over which conflict India chooses to intervene in poses a challenge. In addition, India will be judged on the consistency of its message- if “dialogue and diplomacy” are indeed the “only way forward”, then it is difficult to account for the Modi government’s refusal to consider an opening with Pakistan, for example.

Eventually, the balance of the pull and push factors will decide how far New Delhi will go as a peace-maker in the war that has consumed Europe and the U.S. for more than 30 months. As a country of considerable consequence in the world, one that straddles the West and the east, the Global North and South, and as the only country that is member of both the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States) and BRICS, India is uniquely positioned. The critical element is the timing of its foray into a field that has, thus far, only seen failure. As the late Israeli interlocutor Abba Eban once said in words that are as true for the conflict he attempted to resolve as they are for the Russia-Ukraine war: “History teaches us that men and nations only behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives.”

suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in