India’s geopolitical vision should be larger

Earlier this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin thanked world leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for their “noble mission” to end the fighting between Ukraine and Russia. This has brought cheer to Indians.

But there is a question to be asked — Why has India refrained from playing a more active political role in regional and international conflicts around the world?

This is all the more surprising when one considers the decisive steps taken by Indian leaders in conflicts in the neighbourhood whether, inter alia, in Bangladesh in 1971 when India helped stop a genocide and give birth to a new nation; in the Maldives in 1988 by stopping armed mercenaries overthrow its President; in Sri Lanka in 2009 by helping in the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or, recently, by combating piracy in the region.

Let there be no mistake. India has been an active net contributor to global public good whether through the ‘Vaccine Maitri’ initiative during the COVID-19 pandemic, robust climate action which includes establishing the International Solar Alliance, the sharing of digital public infrastructure to the world or its role as first responder during natural disasters.

A reticence

However, in the last two decades, India has, rightly, prioritised economic growth, both under the United Progressive Alliance and National Democratic Alliance governments. This has catapulted India to the rank of fifth largest economy. Having reached there, we seem to have convinced ourselves that if we take an active political role in global or regional conflicts, it could adversely affect our growth and development.

India’s reticence may also stem from the fact that it feels that getting involved in regional conflicts will upset the strong bilateral relations that have been carefully cultivated with countries. Or that these conflicts are best left to key players in that region and outside, like in West Asia where India has big stakes but does not want to be more proactive than the Gulf countries, which are lukewarm to the unfolding tragedy in Gaza and the region. Yes, all of the above has some rationale. At a time when the world order is disintegrating, and with India having global ambitions of its own, India’s geopolitical vision should be larger, which will only help, not hinder, our economic ambitions.

Historically, one will be right to say that India provided political leadership to the Non-Aligned Movement to empower developing countries emerging from colonisation to find their voice. One might also be right to say that our multi-alignment policy of today is an equally compelling political stand to navigate geopolitical fissures by strengthening our bilateral relations with every key country. But non-alignment was also for the Global South while multi-alignment is primarily for us.

However, when a country becomes the fifth largest economy, prides itself as a thriving democracy, aspires for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat as a permanent member and also aspires to be an important pole in a multipolar world, the expectations of the international community from India only increase. India needs to do much more than take a stand or be a bystander. If in the UNSC, India claims that decisions are not credible without the participation of the world’s largest democracy, then this logic applies equally to decisions taken outside the UNSC.

Mr. Putin’s statement is an expression of gratitude to India’s Prime Minister, who made a bold statement in his visiting Russia last year in the midst of the Ukraine war. India’s decision to abstain on UNSC votes on the war, when there was considerable pressure to vote against Russia, influenced big developing countries to take a more balanced position on the war. Further, Mr. Modi had conveyed to the Russian President earlier that this is “not an era of war” and pressed him not to use nuclear arms. But Mr. Putin’s statement is also a subtle encouragement to India to play a much bigger role. When India is one of the few countries with credibility which can speak to both Russia and Ukraine, should it not be on the high table?

There is a global reset

The flip side is that if India does not meet those expectations, it is ceding space to countries such as Türkiye or Saudi Arabia or Qatar, to tackle conflicts in Europe, West Asia, Africa, or the South China Sea, where the stakes for India are high. The meeting between Ukraine and Russia in 2022 took place in Türkiye. The U.S.-Russia and U.S.-Ukraine talks that took place in Saudi Arabia recently, fit into an ambitious Saudi Arabia’s version of multi-alignment. And just now, the Presidents of Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo met in Qatar to forge a ceasefire in eastern Congo. Further, geopolitical clout is something the Trump 2.0 administration recognises, unlike when India was ignored by its ‘strategic partner’ the U.S. during Troika Plus talks on Afghanistan, or in Bangladesh recently, in India’s own neighbourhood.

Faced with a global reset, with the U.S. and parts of Europe lurching to the right, where the U.S. could downsize its engagements in some regions, particularly Europe and Asia on the one hand, and with fragmentation of trade and rising protectionism on the other, India needs to reach outwards instead of just trying to protect its space. Given that its adversarial relations with China are not going to vanish anytime soon and its trade deficit with China is set to increase with the supply chains closely linked, strengthening of alignments with friends in theatres outside the region is key. It becomes even more relevant when the U.S. and China move towards a “deal” which could end up dividing regions into their spheres of influence and the balance of power shifts in Asia, where the Quad (India, Japan, Australia and the U.S.) could potentially lose its strategic relevance and India comes under pressure.

A time for a shift and also reform

This calls for regional policies, since regional policy is not just the sum of India’s bilateral relations with countries in that region, be it West Asia or Central Asia. For example, India developed close bilateral relations with the Central Asian countries and important regional stakes, but downgraded its participation in the regional grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. East Asia demands India’s enhanced attention too, especially after its refusal to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This is the time for a strategic shift towards Europe, which is under pressure. And also a time to undertake internal economic reforms to enhance India’s competitiveness and meet U.S. expectations on a bilateral trade agreement, which could be the fulcrum for a broader engagement with the Trump 2.0 administration. However, being proactive in conflicts does not mean that India becomes a mediator or passes messages from one party to another. Further, waiting for warring parties or a dominant power such as America to invite India may be a prudent policy, but they will not ask India unless New Delhi conveys its readiness to be a geopolitical player committed to international peace and security.

For example, India played an important role, but not a mediatory one, in the Korean war in the UN Security Council between 1951-52 barely four years after Indian independence. The fact that India was an impoverished nation did not deter it. In recognition, it was made chair of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. During India’s recent stint in the UNSC (2021-22), it was a bridge for divergent views.

Therefore, in a ‘Trumpian’ world, and as the world order gets shaped in favour of the big powers, both old and new, and when there is geopolitical fragmentation, even unilateralism, let us not treat economic development and geopolitics as mutually exclusive. We need to practise multi-alignment in all its dimensions to gain the full benefits. India should use the window of Trump 2.0 and emerge as a major pole by actively shaping a disintegrating world order.

T.S. Tirumurti was Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, New York (2020-22) and President of UN Security Council for August 2021