Depressing pattern: On the Srikakulam stampede

Sadly, the Srikakulam crowd collapse that occurred in a private and unregistered temple, on a day when high footfall was expected, is hardly surprising. Reports indicate that there was one combined entry and exit, public use of an under-construction area, inadequate stewarding, severe capacity overshoot, and weak infrastructure. The Hathras crowd crush in 2024 followed an event where permission was reportedly given for only a third of the crowd that attended, and investigations cited inadequate exits and gaps in planning and supervision. The 2011 Sabarimala crush also revealed systemic weaknesses in circulation control on a day with predictable surges and a trigger that became lethal due to constrained pathways. These incidents had different proximate triggers but the same causes of failure: reciprocal pedestrian flows and shared gates, weak physical public infrastructure, and a lack of real-time density monitoring. India already has guidance to anticipate these failures, including the 2014 National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) guidelines and the National Building Code (NBC). Indian authorities have already demonstrated a feasible path from guidance to operations, including in recent Sabarimala seasons and with the Integrated Command and Control Centre operating at Tirumala. This includes licensed plans compliant with NDMA or NBC prescriptions; calculated occupancy; certified structures that prevent bidirectional flows; real-time density control by trained stewards; and real-time communications and crowd analytics. The persistence of stampedes is due to the gap between guidance and enforced practice.

That almost 80% of stampedes in India occur at religious gatherings or pilgrimages is not coincidental. Pilgrim and congregational events often proceed without any licence that ties permission to a crowd safety plan that can be tested for compliance. Authorities often infer the capacity from the space available, rather than what can be estimated from egress options and evacuation times, tolerate bad or no gating plans, accept temporary barricades without certified load ratings, and do not cordon off areas with construction materials. Public safety is a process and its absence, including during crowding disasters, is rarely due to single-point failures. The Srikakulam incident aligns with a known risk pattern and only disciplined adoption of the country’s own codes, enforced by licensing, will reverse it. India also needs a policy culture that treats religious events as engineered systems requiring licensing and auditing.