The new criminal laws are said to be pro-women in their scope, but the suicide of a young lady doctor in Phaltan, in Satara district, Maharashtra, in October 2025, was a wake-up call that much needs to be done still. The doctor had written a note on the palm of her hand that alleged rape and harassment by a police official and another man.
Her passing highlights the first crime, which is the failure of administrative systems that purportedly disregarded her pleas for help. The second crime is derived from this, which is the public character assassination that follows when a victim’s family begin their quest for justice.
This secondary victimisation by society was evident in the comments made by the Chairperson of the Maharashtra State Commission for Women, who, in public statements, had details about the victim’s private communication and relationships. These comments — often viewed as shifting blame and questioning the victim’s behaviour — reveal how strongly the culture of questioning the victim and behaviour persists even among those who are committed to protecting women.
Unless India addresses this ‘second crime’ with the same legal and moral seriousness as the original offence, no amount of legislative changes will lead to genuine justice. Although the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, aims to create a more women-centric criminal justice system, the Phaltan case remains a stark reminder of the challenges ahead.
Can a new criminal law truly safeguard a victim’s dignity when the very institution she worked for, the State Commission responsible for ensuring her rights and her dignity, and the society that she represents, are all determined to damage her character?
Often, ignorance of the law leads to damage.
The core of the legal mandate to protect a victim’s dignity lies in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, often called the “Nirbhaya Act”. These amendments were legislative acts of conscience, specifically designed to dismantle the very foundation of character assassination in rape trials, often used in the public sphere.
Prohibition on character evidence
Criminal jurisprudence has developed to the extent of making amendments to prevent the ‘character assassination’ of victims. The addition of Section 53A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, now Section 50 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, legally implies that a woman’s personal life, her friendships, messages or habits cannot be used by the defence to argue that she “deserved it” or that her consent should be presumed.
The amendment to Section 146, Indian Evidence Act (Section 48 of BSA) is to prohibit questions being put to a victim during cross-examination regarding her “general immoral character or previous sexual experience”. The focus has to remain strictly on the facts of the alleged crime. Thus, the law has evolved and even when it comes to presumption, there have been various amendments to make the laws more women-friendly.
Some of the key directives
The Supreme Court of India has delivered a series of landmark judgments that unequivocally shield the dignity of victims/survivors of sexual violence. First, irrelevance of prior sexual history. In The State Of Punjab vs Gurmit Singh & Ors. (1996), the Court emphatically stated that the victim’s testimony should not be viewed with suspicion simply because she is a woman. It warned against dismissing a victim’s evidence based on a perception of “loose morals”, stating that every woman, regardless of her character, has the right to refuse sexual intercourse.
Second, insult to injury. The Court has repeatedly observed, under wider scope, that subjecting a victim to intense scrutiny, searching for minor discrepancies, and casting aspersions on her character only add “insult to injury” — a clear condemnation of the very essence of victim-blaming. In the Phaltan case, the victim’s family had to face this.
Third, the ban on identity disclosure (Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code, now Section 72 of the BNS). In several judgments, including comprehensive directions issued in 2018 and 2019, the Court has mandated that no person shall print or publish the name or any matter that may make known the identity of a sexual assault victim. This blanket ban extends even to a deceased person unless a competent authority determines otherwise. This legal provision exists specifically to prevent the public shaming and character assassination that disclosure often invites. Subjecting a dying declaration to media scrutiny was a gross violation and interfered with the Commission’s investigation. It raises questions about the investigation’s progression into abetment to suicide or murder. Prima facie, a dying declaration points to abetment to suicide. Lawyers for the complainant were not allowed to see the investigation report, highlighting the misery of the victim’s relatives experiencing the trauma of the victim’s personal information being shared in the media.
The Phaltan case exemplifies how institutional commentary may inadvertently result in character assassination, a practice that is strictly prohibited under criminal law within judicial proceedings.
The comments by public functionaries, using details of the victim’s personal communication, are akin to an extra-judicial function of victim shaming. They create a public opinion, a “social verdict”, that tries the victim’s character, effectively achieving the ‘second crime’ that the 2013 Amendment was designed to eradicate from judicial procedure.
This act, while not technically a violation of the ban on identity disclosure (as the victim’s name was widely known), is a breach of the spirit of the judicial directions: to treat the victim with fairness, respect and dignity. It is an institutional act of de facto character assassination.
The hurdles, the steps to take
Passing laws alone does not guarantee real justice, as there is a large gap between policy and practice that needs to be bridged. The irony is that while the law has moved forward, the societal mindset is still rooted in a patriarchal past. The Phaltan case exposes the profound contradiction between this strong judicial mandate and failed social behaviour.
The solution lies in championing a bold, women-centric approach by focusing on game-changing implementation strategies.
First, training and sensitisation. The police, prosecutors, and judges must be trained and sensitised to understand and respond empathetically to the trauma that victims endure, especially in sensitive cases that concern sexual assault and domestic violence.
Second, end victim blaming. As a society, we need to stop being tolerant of societal attitudes that question a victim’s character. There is also a need to transform the investigation culture making it truly victim-friendly.
Third, resource boost. The new criminal law lays an emphasis on forensic and digital evidence, but there is a lack of infrastructure. It is time to expand laboratories, invest in advanced forensic facilities, have dedicated women’s desks, and ensure accessible legal aid. This will make safeguards such as audio-visual statements and clear victim communication the standard tools of justice.
When a woman in a position of authority, whether constitutional, political, or judicial, chooses to engage in the character assassination of a female victim, it represents ultimate moral failure. It is a lack of responsibility and a catastrophic betrayal of solidarity.
The moment has arrived for women in power to truly grasp the constitutional morality that underpins their roles and responsibilities. Our society yearns for women who champion equity, going beyond mere representation, to inspire meaningful change. Together, we can transform legal reforms into powerful actions that uplift and safeguard victims, ensuring that society cannot afford to fail.
Kshitijaa Wadatkar Wankhede is Advocate, Bombay High Court, Mumbai
