Any meaningful conversation about the political representation of animals must begin by challenging the deep anthropocentric assumptions embedded in modern political thought. The core issue is not just cruelty but also the structural design of democracy itself, built on a rigid division between “the human” and “the animal”. This foundational split, the original political boundary, positions the animal as the non-subject as it is non-rational, non-political, and a being reduced to “mere life”.
Across history, this single, simplified category of “the animal” has collapsed a vast plurality of non-human worlds into a negative mirror against which human superiority is defined. Language, reason and political agency were claimed for humans by denying these to others. This act of categorical “othering” is what enables the institutionalised exploitation of non-human beings today.
An artificiality of division
The task, therefore, is to expose the artificiality of this division. Animals are not a homogeneous mass but a heterogeneous multiplicity of beings whose lives impose distinct moral and political obligations. The problem we face is not a deficit of compassion but a structural flaw; democratic institutions treat animals as property, creating an institutional vacuum where their interests are never represented, measured or defended. This legal erasure is the root of systemic violence.
Politically, this means that animals cannot remain passive objects of charity. Their lives place a demand on the political community; they make humans morally and politically accountable. Representation is not about granting animals anthropocentric rights such as voting. It is about formalising the representation of absolute vulnerability and unchosen dependency within democratic decision-making.
This reframes the human role from benevolent caretaker to responsible political steward, whose decisions about land, food systems, environment and security must be justified in the light of animal interests. The basis for representation, therefore, is sentience and embodiment, not cognitive capacity. This requires creating fiduciary institutions or guardians whose sole democratic mandate is to articulate these interests in legislative and administrative processes. The long-standing strategy of requiring non-human animals to prove that they are “like us” to deserve protection is flawed and discriminatory. It evaluates the worth of species by how closely they mirror human abilities — an impossible and biased standard that would exclude most life forms from political standing. Representation must be grounded in morally relevant capacities shared across species, rather than human-centric criteria.
From this foundation follows the need for institutional design. Majoritarian democracy, by its nature, cannot represent animals: they have no electoral power, no lobbying influence, and no economic leverage. Democratic legitimacy, therefore, requires non-majoritarian pathways of representation — fiduciary institutions or guardians whose sole mandate is to articulate animal interests within legislative, administrative, and regulatory processes. This mirrors existing mechanisms that represent humans who cannot represent themselves, including institutions for children’s rights, environmental protection, data protection and future generations. The same logic must now extend to animals.
This is analogous to the existing fiduciary institutions designed to protect diffuse, vulnerable interests that cannot speak for themselves, such as children’s rights, environmental protection agencies, or data protection authorities. The same logic needs to be extended to animals.
Institutional representation is necessary because animal interests are systematically overridden by powerful economic and political actors. Animals cannot lobby, mobilise, or litigate without human intermediaries. The current welfare frameworks are reactive, not proactive; political representation must ensure ex ante protection before harm occurs.
Animal representation requires independence because governments cannot credibly commit to protecting animal interests when those very governments benefit from animal exploitation through tax revenue, agricultural subsidies and political support from agribusiness. Determining animal interests requires scientific expertise in ethology, cognition, and welfare science — domains where majoritarian processes are inadequate.
Just as modern democracies create non-majoritarian institutions to protect diffuse, vulnerable interests that cannot represent themselves, children’s rights agencies, environmental protection agencies, and data protection authorities, the same logic must extend to animals. Advisory committees controlled by industry representatives cannot protect animal interests. Neither can people appointed through standard political channels. What is needed is structural independence with constitutional protection, enforcement powers and accountability mechanisms that prevent capture by economic interests.
Humans as accountable trustees
Fiduciary institutions for animals should be built on a simple idea, humans act as accountable trustees. Their job is to protect the interests of animals with care, loyalty and prudence. This shifts the model from lobbying to genuine guardianship, where representatives speak impartially for animals’ vulnerability-based needs. For this to work, these institutions must be operationally independent — with fixed terms, transparent and diverse appointments, and their own budgets — so that they are insulated from political pressure and cannot be captured by powerful interests.
The Supreme Court of India created such an institution for elephants. Having understood that elephants were vulnerable to the extreme and that hundreds were being killed in captivity, the Court created a high-powered committee to look into the well-being and possible rescue of individual animals. The committee is headed by a retired Supreme Court judge and has senior officers in it. It has enormous powers. But, alas, it has degenerated into a committee that meets in different places across India, puts off decisions till it meets again in yet another exotic locale. A year ago, I had sent a list of 19 elephants (with proof ), tortured and beaten by their owners. No decision has been taken on even one. Three have died. This is yet another example of a so-called fiduciary institution which does not take itself seriously.
Running the operation
Animal-representation bodies should operate at several levels of government. At the executive level, advisory councils can review proposed rules for animal welfare impacts. In Parliament, dedicated committees or subcommittees can examine legislation that affects animals, propose amendments, and demand impact assessments. Non-voting delegates or expert representatives should be integrated into parliamentary processes, ensuring that animal interests are considered at the core of law-making without disrupting democratic voting structures — similar to how fiscal oversight bodies operate. To prevent these systems from becoming dependent on individual personalities, they must run on clear, rule-based procedures. Reviews should be automatically triggered whenever a policy is likely to affect animals. Welfare impacts should be assessed through standard scientific metrics and published transparently. Appointments should be based on expertise, with fixed terms and rotation to avoid capture. This converts goodwill-based advocacy into predictable institutional routines.
Strong accountability systems should be in place to ensure that these bodies function with integrity. Horizontal checks should complement vertical oversight by elected bodies. Independent annual audits should evaluate performance against clear welfare benchmarks, such as reductions in preventable harms. Making audit findings should be made public.
Transparency is central. All decisions, reasoning and vetoes must be published so that the public and civil society can scrutinise them. To prevent elite capture, institutions should be required to consult diverse stakeholders.
Reform must be gradual. Start with pilot projects in manageable areas, such as requiring animal-impact reviews in urban planning. Use these pilots to refine tools, data systems, and protocols.
Funding should come from reallocated harmful subsidies or ring-fenced public budgets. Public education campaigns should build citizen support and normalise stewardship of animals as a democratic responsibility.
Institutionalising animal representation is not an abstract moral project. It is a practical deepening of democracy — one where vulnerable beings that cannot speak are still accounted for, and where independence, expertise and accountability replace goodwill or personal influence.
Maneka Sanjay Gandhi is Chairperson, People for Animals and a former Member of Parliament (Bharatiya Janata Party)
Published – December 01, 2025 12:16 am IST
