The lapses in the disaster management Bill

A seafaring graffiti is seen on the fading wall of an abandoned house on December 24, 2024 in Seruthur village, Velankanni, Tamil Nadu. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami had a devastating impact on India, resulting in the loss of over 10,000 lives and affecting thousands more, with significant damage to infrastructure and livelihoods, particularly in coastal regions like Tamil Nadu and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
| Photo Credit: Getty Images

The Disaster Management (Amendment) Bill, 2024, raises serious concerns. Instead of filling in the gaps in the Disaster Management Act (DMA), 2005, the Bill has removed scope for participatory governance, accountability, and efficiency from the Act.

The lapses

First, the semantics. The Bill uses top-down guarded terminology such as ‘monitor’ and ‘guidelines’. Instead, terms such as ‘supervision’ and ‘direction’ could have established greater trust and bonding with communities and local governments. On the other hand, in global legal research documents, such as the Yokohama Strategy, the Hyogo Framework for Action, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, local communities are known as the ‘first responders’ to disasters. It is imperative to build on the capacities and wisdom of local communities.

Second, even though the Bill defines a ‘hazard’, ‘resilience’, and ‘vulnerability’, these definitions are mere mechanical words or inconsequential without acknowledging the substantive roles of local communities, panchayats, wards and NGOs in disaster management. Whether during Cyclone Aila in 2009 in the Sundarbans, the Kedarnath glacial lake outburst flood of 2013, or the floods in Kerala in 2018, villagers and fisherfolk began rescuing people before the National Disaster Response Force or Coast Guards could reach the victims.

The Bill is silent on intersectional discrimination. Whenever authorities are open to a just approach to discrimination and vulnerability, the datasets change phenomenally. Ignoring intersectional vulnerability even after 20 years of the Act weakens the Bill’s claim to be holistic and inclusive. Women, the disabled, “lower” castes, and LGBTQIA communities may not show the several layers of discrimination they suffer.

There is also nothing in the Bill on the performance evaluation of district authorities. If the authorities had failed to be prepared for a disaster and then a disaster strikes, sometimes they try to take attention away from their dereliction of duty and bring focus to individual philanthropy efforts. This makes the ground fertile for political poaching of the electorate.

The Bill excludes ‘law and order’ from the Act. It clarifies that, ‘the expression “man made causes” does not include any law and order related matter’. Why then does it bring the State Director Generals of Police into the State Executive Committees (SECs)?

Accountability is the next casualty. Sections 12 and 13 of the DMA, which covered the minimum standards of relief for disaster victims and the possibility of loan repayment relief, have been omitted. Similarly, Section 19, which demanded that State governments follow guidelines on minimum standards of relief, has also been dropped. These Sections also carried special provisions for widows, orphans, the homeless, and provided ex gratia assistance on account of loss of life as also assistance on account of damage to houses and for restoration of means of livelihood. There is no replacement for this in the Bill.

The DMA had made some mandatory requirements for better enforcement of disaster management provisions by various departments and ministries under the Government of India. Section 35(2b) and Section 35(2d) that ensured integration and preparedness in the plans have been dropped in the Bill. At another place, the SEC no longer has to do basic homework for preparedness; sub clauses (2a) and (2b) of Section 22 are deleted in the Bill. There is little in terms of good governance in the Bill as most of its measurable indices for performance assessment of officials in the field are fuzzy or inaccurately mentioned.

The Bill also suffers from speciesism. The thousands of animals which die after every disaster are not even mentioned. The District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA) seem to have little responsibility in implementing the Animal Birth Control (ABC) Rules, 2023, brought out by the same government. This gap fails the Rules as well as the preparedness for a disaster.

The Bill suggests an Urban Disaster Management Authority (UDMA) under Section of 41A. What brought the need for this additional authority? It is unclear. The Municipal Corporation is the highest revenue generator for any city as it controls land, buildings, builders, and property taxation. But in what way can a Municipal Corporation improve disaster management if it encourages urban flooding by allowing encroachments over aquifers, water bodies, city forests, river beds and markets?

Regional collaboration

Finally, the world is grappling with zoonotic and epizootic diseases. Given this scenario, a regional plan of action through increased trust, collaboration, and emergency strategies was awaited. The Bill could have mentioned regional groupings such as SAARC, BIMSTEC, and BRICS, to be approached in the event of a disaster. The Bill was expected to encourage international collaboration, democratisation, and decentralisation of the role and responsibilities of the National Disaster Management Authority. It could have at least referred to the 2011 SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters. Given the porous boundaries of South Asian countires, to ignore regional collaboration is a serious lapse.

Amita Singh, Founder Chairperson, Special Centre for Disaster Research, and former Professor, Centre for Law and Governance, JNU